Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA): Issues and Options for Congress

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A decade ago the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority , especially its Metrorail system, was viewed by many as the model U.S. metropolitan transit operation. In 2010, the view is changed. The fatal accidents of 2009, other safety problems, ongoing service interruptions, funding problems, and a perceived lack of management direction have caused many in the region and in Congress to believe that substantive changes are needed in its funding, structure, and operations. Although WMATA is a regional body, Congress played an instrumental role in its creation, and continues to play an ongoing role in the financing of the system. This report provides background information about the system, describes the major issues WMATA currently faces, and discusses possible approaches for addressing these issues.

WMATA’s funding, management, and safety are the three main issues that are likely to be of most interest to Congress. Funding is a perennial problem for WMATA, as it is for most public transit agencies, because it is heavily reliant on government support to cover both capital and operating costs. Transit advocates argue that the federal government ought to substantially increase the resources it devotes to supporting buses and trains. But a general increase in federal transit funding is unlikely to make a great difference to WMATA, so many argue for special federal funding. Congress has already authorized $150 million per year over a 10-year period for WMATA, but Congress might decide to revisit this decision in light of its current problems. Other approaches might be to pursue ways to encourage WMATA to boost revenues from fares and other revenues, to encourage the jurisdictions to fund the expenses of paratransit from sources other than transportation system revenues, or to encourage states and localities to inject more competition into the provision of transit service.

WMATA’s management structure, in particular its Board, is not based on a private sector corporation model, but is probably best viewed as following a public utility model. In this public utility framework, the general manager is heavily constrained by the Board in his/her ability to make crucial decisions on what would otherwise be viewed as normal business activities in a private sector transportation firm—for example, fare setting, route selection, and frequency of service determinations. Some are concerned that WMATA’s Board lacks the subject expertise and political independence necessary to evaluate operational decisions in the context of what is the best decision from a transit operating perspective as opposed to the political perspective . Congress, therefore, might choose to take a serious look at WMATA’s governance structure.

A number of recent incidents resulting in deaths, injuries, and property damage have raised public concern about the safety of WMATA’s operations. Ultimately, safety is the responsibility of WMATA, and federal regulation of transit safety is largely prohibited by law. However, federal law requires states with rail systems, other than commuter rail systems already regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration , to establish a safety oversight program, and establish an organization to oversee safety of rail transit systems. Metrorail is overseen by the Tri-State Oversight Committee . A federal review of WMATA and its oversight reported severe problems with the TOC, including a lack of resources, and that WMATA’s Safety Department is in disarray. Other reports have come to similar conclusions. One option for Congress to improve public transit safety might be to provide funding for State Safety Oversight organizations, including funds for training.