An ‘Exit Strategy’ Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963–67

United States Army Command and General Staff College

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This book has footnotes, list of acronyms and terms, maps, charts, glossary, bibliography, and appendix. It is from Combat Studies Institute Press and Stephen Andrew Campbell .

“The British Army is often praised for a particular skill in small wars or counter-insurgencies ... When thinking about the British record, and the validity of ‘British ideas’ on how best to fight and win at COIN, it is useful to examine a less well-known conflict — the war in South Arabia . Although the war was part of the decolonization of the British Empire in the 1960s, the South Arabian conflict has much in common with recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan: challenging terrain and people; intricate local politics; a de facto nation-building task; an externally-sponsored insurgency with safe havens in a neighboring state; finally, an unexpected major change in strategy-in this case to unilateral withdrawal .

“This study examines the relationship between strategy, operational art and intelligence in the context of the British government’s controversial decision in February 1966 to reverse its course by adopting an exit strategy with a public timeline. One of the unintended consequences of this decision was to cripple the ability of the withdrawing military to collect intelligence from the local populace. As a result of the shift in strategy, UK forces were more vulnerable and the British government less able to achieve the limited objectives of its new policy and strategy. Consequently, British forces became increasingly blind and faced greater violence from the insurgents with their intelligence organization simply overwhelmed. British forces were of little use with the critical strategic task of helping the British government identify the dominant local factions with whom to negotiate.

“This study focuses on the performance of the UK’s intelligence apparatus — particularly the critical importance of creating an adaptable intelligence organization and how it was affected by the change of strategy. It also explores the extent to which the British military identified and addressed its experiences in South Arabia and incorporated the lessons of the conflict into its institutions. Analysis of the South Arabia campaign highlights the importance of adaptation and prioritizing intelligence as a method of regaining the initiative from the enemy. It also illustrates the importance of understanding the consequences of fundamental changes in policy — particularly for intelligence — if the military is expected to succeed at executing an ‘exit’ strategy. Finally, the value of intellectual honesty, moral courage and critical self-reflection is advocated lest we choose to ignore valuable insights and lessons gained in the hardest way.”

“The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt for cruder alternatives… The Art of War Program places contemporary operations in a historical framework by examining earlier military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected to show the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns throughout the modern era.

Pages: 232

Format: Kindle Edition

Release: December 26, 2018

An ‘Exit Strategy’ Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963–67

United States Army Command and General Staff College

0/5 ( ratings)

Read Download

Pages: 232

Format: Kindle Edition

Release: December 26, 2018

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An ‘Exit Strategy’ Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963–67

An ‘Exit Strategy’ Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963–67

An ‘Exit Strategy’ Not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons Learned From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963–67

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