Arguably the most important lesson to draw today from the difficult history of
nuclear negotiations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may be about what isn’t possible – namely, a continuation, in anything like its present form, of the negotiating process begun in the early 1990s and continued, in fits and starts, over the ensuing two decades. The structural and political foundations of this process have changed too much, from the U.S. perspective, for any such continuation to be possible or advisable. If there is a future for engagement with the DPRK on nuclear issues, it will have to await a fundamental change in approach by Pyongyang.
Arguably the most important lesson to draw today from the difficult history of
nuclear negotiations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may be about what isn’t possible – namely, a continuation, in anything like its present form, of the negotiating process begun in the early 1990s and continued, in fits and starts, over the ensuing two decades. The structural and political foundations of this process have changed too much, from the U.S. perspective, for any such continuation to be possible or advisable. If there is a future for engagement with the DPRK on nuclear issues, it will have to await a fundamental change in approach by Pyongyang.