The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 caused one of the most serious international crises since the end of the Second World War, and Britain's response is still a matter of considerable controversy. Making extensive use of official material which has recently been released and which casts particular illumination on the rupture that Suez caused in Anglo-American relations, David Carlton provides a succinct account of the affair. He examines the long-term and short-term causes; the principal events from nationalization until the aborting of the military operation in November 1956; and the consequences of the crisis for the standing of Britain with the rest of the world.
The author also reveals the full extent of the collusion that took place among the British, the French and the Israelis before the famous ultimatum was sent to Egypt. And he considers carefully the role in the crisis of Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden. Was he obsessed with a personal vendetta against Colonel Nasser? Was he simply a sick man unfit to make decisions? Or was he the victim of intolerable domestic pressures and the disloyalty of certain Cabinet colleagues who saw fit to communicate with President Eisenhower behind his back?
Britain and the Suez Crisis is a highly accessible account of a major cause celebre in post-war British history.
The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 caused one of the most serious international crises since the end of the Second World War, and Britain's response is still a matter of considerable controversy. Making extensive use of official material which has recently been released and which casts particular illumination on the rupture that Suez caused in Anglo-American relations, David Carlton provides a succinct account of the affair. He examines the long-term and short-term causes; the principal events from nationalization until the aborting of the military operation in November 1956; and the consequences of the crisis for the standing of Britain with the rest of the world.
The author also reveals the full extent of the collusion that took place among the British, the French and the Israelis before the famous ultimatum was sent to Egypt. And he considers carefully the role in the crisis of Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden. Was he obsessed with a personal vendetta against Colonel Nasser? Was he simply a sick man unfit to make decisions? Or was he the victim of intolerable domestic pressures and the disloyalty of certain Cabinet colleagues who saw fit to communicate with President Eisenhower behind his back?
Britain and the Suez Crisis is a highly accessible account of a major cause celebre in post-war British history.